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INTRODUCTION 
 
Canada is used to the image of itself as a very small country, forever vulnerable to a 
large and powerful neighbour to the south.  A recent Canadian prime minister likened 
this to a mouse sleeping beside an elephant, with its attendant dangers of being 
squashed.  Whether this justifies Canada’s mouse-like caution in foreign affairs, an 
attitude which puzzles our much smaller and more daring neighbours in Northern 
Europe, we accept it as part of our heritage.  Even our most worldly political leaders 
have felt compelled to reply to slights of Canada when made by Americans – any 
Americans – although part of our national personality is to grumble about the 
Americans as habitually as about the weather. 
 
It would therefore surprise most Canadians to know that in respect of our smaller 
neighbours, too, we have a reputation for insensitivity, for ignorance, for the de-
valuing of other cultures and ways of life.  Most Canadians would be surprised to hear 
that we have any neighbours other than the USA.  This is an Arctic conference so I 
will not discuss Canada’s Caribbean connections.  The emerging nation, Greenland, 
full of the sensitivities and sense of dignity of a new government, of a newly 
recognised country within the cluster of governments represented in the Nordic 
Council, and of a minority people recovering cultural self-confidence after centuries 
of domination by Europeans, is our Northern neighbour.  Greenland and Greenlanders 
feel our slights. 
 
To give one example, the Davis Strait fishery adjacent to the towns and villages of 
West Greenland (where most Greenlanders live) is the main economic base of 
Greenland.  There is extreme sensitivity about any actions or activities which threaten 
that fishery.  Sensitivity to foreign fishing vessels in those waters prompted the 
unprecedented pull-out by Greenland from the European Economic Community 
[former name of EU].  That same sensitivity led to passionate Greenland representations 
before Canada’s National Energy Board in the early 1980s against the Arctic Pilot 
Project.  That project would have seen tanker traffic in Davis Strait bringing liquefied 
natural gas from the Canadian Arctic to world markets.  Greenlanders – and Inuit in 
Canada as well – feared that the project was, in fact, a pilot project not only for vessel 
traffic but also for getting industrial projects through the shoals of public regulation 
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and environmental concern, and was only a small beginning for the more dangerous 
shipment of oil later. 
 
In the first months of 1984 the PanArctic project, Bent Horn, to drill for oil in 
Canada’s Arctic islands and then ship it south through Lancaster Sound and Davis 
Strait, was eagerly promoted by government officials as well as by the company itself.  
Inuit reaction in Northern Canada was quick, and so was the reaction of Greenland’s 
Inuit population.  For several weeks Canadian Inuit from the Lancaster Sound area, 
supported by Inuit of other regions in Canada and in coordination with Greenlanders 
through the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, made their views known to government in 
the strongest terms.  All of this was fully reported in a series of clear articles in the 
Globe and Mail Report on Business at the time, and received much other coverage.  
In Greenland it was regularly the lead item on the national radio news, the main news 
source in the country, even though the difficult and controversial EEC pull-out was 
being negotiated at the time by Greenland’s top politicians at meetings in Bruxelles.  
Federal and territorial officials were provided with material, many meetings were held 
by Inuit with government, and Canada’s ambassador in Copenhagen was called in to 
answer questions by Danish ministers. 
 
A year later, with a new government in office in Ottawa, but with mostly the same 
cast of advisers and officials in place, the Canadian and Northwest Territories 
governments jointly announced approval of the Bent Horn project (on February 5, 
1985, in Yellowknife, by the federal Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development and the territorial Minister of Economic Development).  Greenland’s 
interests and sensitivities were not mentioned, nor did the word ‘international’ appear 
anywhere in the press releases or supporting background papers.  Officials with whom 
I have spoken close to the approval process cannot recall hearing any discussion of 
international issues.  And the Greenland government itself was too shy to protest, 
fearing that Canadian opinion would be sceptical after Greenlandic-Danish approval 
earlier of an on-shore oil exploration program on Greenland’s east coast at Jameson 
Land. 
 
Shipping oil through the iceberg-strewn waters off Greenland’s west coast is probably 
the most provocative act a Canadian government could perform towards Greenlanders 
at the present time.  There is a recent cooperation agreement respecting the 
environment in force between Greenland/Denmark and Canada.  Perhaps behind 
closed doors some politicians and officials have now made their peace over the issue, 
but the people of Greenland – and of the Inuit villages of Canada’s Eastern Arctic – 
are not reassured.  After all, Greenland has withdrawn from the EEC for fear of 
remote political deals being made over the Greenland environment and its living 
resources.  The Greenland public was even less reassured when quotations from 
PanArctic’s previous ocean pollution convictions were read over the national radio. 
 
 
GREENLAND AND INUIT INTERNATIONALLY 
 
The Greenland public is made up of the same Inuit people who live across Northern 
Canada – along the coasts of Labrador and Northern Quebec [now known increasingly 
as Nunavik], around the mainland and islands of the Northwest Territories, along the 
Beaufort Sea coast into Alaska – and around the Alaskan coast and offshore islands, 
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as well as in what is presumed the original Inuit homeland, the North-eastern Soviet 
Union.  Sharing a language and a culture, the Inuit peoples of the three North 
American Arctic jurisdictions – USA, Canada and Denmark – united in a new 
organisation, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, or ICC as it is universally known, in 
1977.  The specific incentive to the formation of that organization at that time was 
fear of ocean pollution by oil production and shipping.  Inuit leaders of Alaska’s 
Beaufort Sea coast feared that the great oil companies, and governments in southern 
capitals responsive to such industrial interests, would not respect the needs and 
interests of the permanent Arctic residents, i.e., the Inuit.  Oil companies operated 
comfortably among many jurisdictions, after all, and might even bid down such 
environmental standards as already existed when negotiating with governments eager 
for ‘Northern development’.  Yet the Inuit still rely greatly for their food and 
livelihood on the sea – on its fish and sea mammals.  ICC could act as a watch-dog, 
while also encouraging study of, and exchanging information (and experience) on, 
complex development matters which governments tended not to discuss with their 
Arctic minorities. 
 
When the second ICC assembly was held in 1980, in Nuuk, the newly renamed capital 
(formerly Godthaab) of Greenland, the Greenland delegation at the head and host 
table was dominated by its elected politicians.  These were now the cabinet and MPs 
of a new ‘home rule’ jurisdiction.  When the mayor of Alaska’s huge (88,000 square 
miles [the size of Australia’s State of Victoria]) North Slope Borough had welcomed the 
delegates to the first ICC three years earlier, he had said 
 
Without our [Inuit] central involvement, there can be no safe and responsible 
resource development.  The ultimate result of our land claims movement will 
be the development of strong local governments all across the North American 
Arctic.  The defense of the world’s Arctic environmental security must rest 
upon the strength of local home-rule government.  The motivation behind the 
North Slope Borough’s work in the planning and conduct of this conference 
should be clear to all.  The environmental security of our long municipal 
coastline depends upon the strength of home-rule government in Canada and 
Greenland. 
 
At that conference the Greenland leaders had been anxious not to embark on 
provocative statements because of the delicate state of their home rule negotiations.  
Now, in Nuuk, it was the Canadians who were sensitive in the midst of negotiations 
back home:  processes to develop regional governments in Northern Canada, to settle 
claims, and the opening of the Canadian Constitution itself to amendments confirming 
aboriginal rights.  The Canadian working teams developing the ICC charter before the 
assembly had insisted on provisions which would keep matters relating to Canada in 
Canadian hands.  That is, they did not want ICC notables from other countries using 
the ICC as a platform for statements which could compromise Canadian [i.e., Canadian 
Inuit] interests.  It was this blend of idealism, practical cooperation and pragmatic 
political realism in which ICC was born and in which it continues to thrive today.  
Attempts to represent it as either an Alaskan-bought or Greenlandic-ideologised body 
threatening to Canadian Inuit are spurious.  Equally fatuous are claims one sometimes 
hears in Denmark that Canadian Inuit threaten Greenland social democracy with 
North American free enterprise values. 
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The discovery of North America by Greenlanders has been an exciting opening.  It 
has given them a taste of the wider world of business and political rough-and-tumble 
in modern countries which do not subscribe to the standards and philosophies of 
socialised Northern Europe.  Through Inuit friends with whom they share language, 
diet, cultural lore and a sense of being on the receiving end of southern expansion, 
they have acquired insights into and opportunities in North America and the world.  
ICC’s Greenland delegations represent functional and political bodies – labour, 
hunters, women, the main parties and so on – so through ICC these are able to 
penetrate the international world without activating the foreign relations strictures in 
the Greenland Home Rule Act.  That Act insists on Danish assistance in Greenland’s 
foreign relations, and clear Danish jurisdictional paramountcy.  But it does recognise 
that Greenland and Greenlanders have vital interests abroad (section 16 of the Act).  
Furthermore, on virtually all major issues Denmark has provided sympathetic and 
capable support for Greenlandic interests abroad. 
 
In practice, Greenland’s international activity operates on four principal levels.  
Firstly, as citizens of Denmark, though a small country one of the most outward-
looking and internationalist of modern societies, and one of the greatest contributors 
to international causes and progress, Greenlanders enjoy travel and are intelligent, 
curious travellers like other people from Nordic countries.  They go to see and learn, 
as much as to abdicate a cold climate.  They visit other lands comfortably, especially 
in Western Europe. 
 
Secondly, they are connected through their own political affiliations at home with 
Danish political interests.  In other words, their own politics are informed by the party 
machinations and issues in Copenhagen.  Typically, Danish parties are zealous and 
reformist, active at community and organisational level, with no end of projects for 
reform.  But in power they are invariably part of coalitions which make them used to 
considerable compromise and even immobilism.  The strong advocacy of reformist or 
even radical views is not sure evidence, in short, that the end of the world is at hand.  
And unlike Canada, the visible holding of ideals in Northern Europe is not something 
thought publicly indecent in those above age 21.  There is an integrating dimension to 
this political solidarity, then, as well as an activist and disintegrating dimension. 
 
Thirdly, as a government, and a government which is young enough, new enough, to 
believe what it insists on, namely that it is the true, cultural and unquestioned voice of 
an ancient society, it behaves nevertheless like all other governments.  It makes use of 
‘the Inuit connection’ when necessary and in cultural politics, but it would really 
rather be accepted as a government among governments.  After all, it is in official 
circles where the decisions are made, not at conferences of dispossessed minorities.  
In its pursuit of official acceptance to the highest possible level and the greatest 
possible degree, it is totally adept at ‘playing the game’, and is quite willing to ‘fit in’.  
This has been exemplified in the early months of 1986 by Greenland statements and 
participation in Nordic Council forums, for instance.  When the American president 
welcomes the Greenland premier with full national rites, while Canada dutifully 
follows niceties of protocol, the Americans are as usual displaying good sense while 
we Canadians can pride ourselves only on our virgin propriety.  Ultimately it is an 
open question as to whether Greenland’s government will more reflect its aboriginal 
culture or rather reflect the world’s pragmatic habits in its outward dealings.  The two 
are not, of course, mutually exclusive. 
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Fourthly, through ICC and similar contacts with shared-interest groups, Greenlanders 
– and especially, given the hierarchical nature of Greenland public life, the leading 
public figures – interact abroad with persons in related fields.  Because of the high 
level of socialisation in the Danish realm overall, the rather corporatist nature of 
Greenland political society, and the pride in a resurgent Inuit culture and in the social 
accession to majority rule in their homeland, these persons have reason for self-
confidence when they are abroad.  They believe they have little to learn from the 
Canadian and American Arctic except perhaps in technological matters and some 
aspects of dealing with big business which have been traditionally reserved to Danes 
in their own country.  They feel good about the extent of commitment to social 
equality and well-being in their own country, the strong commitment to reinforcing 
and promoting national language and culture, and their own opportunities in a home 
rule area compared with peoples still struggling under political and social minority 
status elsewhere.  And, combining the Inuit and Danish aptitudes for friendliness and 
good cheer, they are welcome everywhere. 
 
The two areas which interest us most in this conference are the last two matters:  
relations with the Greenland government and with Greenland on other levels.  It is fair 
to say that in Canada there is some intelligent curiosity in official circles in the 
structures and progress of Greenland self-government and self-management because 
of work on similar issues among aboriginal peoples here.  That interest is modest, 
polite, deferential.  But in those circles where the decisions are made which impact on 
Greenland – e.g., fisheries, energy, external relations – Canada has not as yet 
developed a ‘Good Neighbour’ policy.  There is impatience, arrogance, and mostly 
sheer ignorance instead.  Not all the efforts of our capable and energetic current 
ambassador in Copenhagen, who has taken a special interest in Greenland, nor brief 
visits by the Canadian government’s best representatives, notably Northern affairs 
minister David Crombie in August, 1985, can make up for a lack of policy, 
understanding and response in this country towards one of our nearest neighbours. 
 
As for contacts generally, Canadians tend to be intimidated by travel costs, sheer 
unfamiliarity and uncertainty about ‘the system’ in Greenland.  They just don’t go 
there, nor learn much when they do go.  Greenland’s ambiguous and sometimes 
doctrinaire approach to tourism has not encouraged the overcoming of these barriers.  
If Greenland authorities come to see that Canadians and Americans are a large and 
wealthy travel market who would value the very environmental and cultural 
distinctiveness which Greenland wishes to protect from industrial Europe, then the 
basis for a strong and happy social and economic partnership exists.  Meanwhile the 
Canadian Inuit are an important link, not least through ICC:  they speak the language, 
they gain admittance as brothers where other North Americans may be less familiar 
visitors, they have the knowledge and organisational backup to help Greenlanders 
gain access to North American expertise, markets, regulatory regimes and 
governments.  Canadian Inuit have played this role in recent years in an informal way, 
albeit on a very limited scale.  And it may surprise some to know that an important 
figure in the Prime Minister’s election district organisation, a district which includes 
several Inuit villages on the Arctic coast of Ungava Bay, is a Greenlander who has 
married and settled in Kuujjuaq (formerly Fort Chimo).  This individual has brought a 
helpful comparative dimension to not a few discussions on Northern policy. 
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There are no moves towards political integration among Greenlanders and other Inuit.  
Indeed, whenever vague idealism of that kind focuses on practical objects, the 
differences in recent history, in economic philosophy and in public and managerial 
styles become very apparent.  Like French- and English-Canadians, Inuit Canadians 
are Canadians who belong to an international people, language and culture.  But 
politics are national, regional and local.  What binds Inuit together is well stated in the 
preamble of the ICC charter or constitution:  an identification with a unique eco-
system and its protection, the development of occupations which sustain and are 
sustained by the living environment, local institutions which favour real Inuit control 
of decisions affecting their lives, and social responsibility. 
 
Yet at the coming ICC assembly beginning in late July, 1986, in Kotzebue, Alaska, 
public policy will be the main subject of discussion.  What is more, the attempt will 
be made to agree on the principles of a comprehensive Arctic policy.  As principles 
and further details are agreed, now and in future, they would be left to Inuit in the 
various jurisdictions where they live to implement in cooperation with government.  I 
have seen the draft documents as they have developed and they reveal sophistication, 
they often go into considerable detail and they have breadth – in virtually all areas of 
governmental activity.  It seems to me this is a very strong statement in itself.  It says 
that government attention and policies in the Arctic – and government institutions 
themselves – are inadequate at the present time.  Equally, it shows that Inuit are 
committed to working through public institutions and available networks to resolve 
difficulties and build the Inuit future. 
 
 
DYNAMICS AND DEVELOPMENT IN MODERN GREENLAND 
 
It may strike some as odd that I have begun with international interests and only come 
to Greenland’s domestic situation later.  That is deliberate.  I believe that the pattern 
of social and political change and development within Greenland is much more 
significant to the world than is the existing complex of foreign contacts involving 
Greenland.  But also, Greenland is a new country.  It was shaped and is informed as 
much by modern communications and personal travel, by awareness of the world of 
Baby Boom America and post-industrial Europe and a troubled and troubling Third 
World, by study abroad and internationally circulating ideas, as by specific traditions 
in Inuit and in Danish life.  As a ‘third world’ society set squarely in the ‘first world’, 
it may also have intrinsic interest for further study. 
 
Just as Danish policy in Greenland reflected international currents, from the ideas of 
Rousseau to the ideals of the United Nations Charter, so the formation of modern 
Greenland itself has had many influences.  This welter of shaping spirits, so evident 
in, say, Greenland’s considerable graphic art, indicates an exciting and somewhat 
unpredictable future for the society.  Although solidly locked into Nordic 
administrative and institutional forms and habits, this imprinting by a foreign élite, 
and only on some few people until very recent times, may prove less revered and 
dogmatic than elsewhere.  The Greenland population, like other Inuit, are very much 
an ‘open’ society. 
 
Most of Greenland’s international contacts proceed smoothly enough.  However, 
Danish officials have a reputation among the Greenlanders – and with some Canadian 
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observers – for sometimes reading too closely the niceties of Danish rights in respect 
of Greenland’s foreign relations, and even for discouraging various innocent contacts.  
This pettifogging attitude, where it exists, detracts from the large-mindedness and 
progressive spirit of the Danish accommodation of Inuit Greenland.  It also serves as a 
needless irritant in Danish-Greenlandic relations. 
 
I have attended many international gatherings over many years, and when the 
Greenlanders rub shoulders with peoples from Canada and the USA and other 
Northern countries, and indeed from quite other areas of the earth, their relative ease 
and pre-eminence in international settings is obvious.  My last comment on 
specifically international relations will be this:  that a characteristic not only of 
Greenland, but of the other Northern minority peoples around the world, is that 
because they feel national policy and institutions have failed them, they look 
elsewhere for inspiration and assistance.  A corollary of that is that the majority 
ideology, historical assumptions and political culture which have supported those 
national policies are also discredited.  No, they do not look to a rival Superpower or 
national enemies; they look increasingly to other minorities and out-groups.  In the 
case of Greenland this means looking to the Inuit of North America and to the small 
non-EEC countries of the North Atlantic, i.e., Iceland, the Faroe Islands, Norway, and 
it means a strong identification with minority peoples elsewhere, notably through ICC 
and the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (in which Greenland played a vital 
founding role). 
 
 
THE COMING OF HOME RULE 
 
Greenland was, until World War II, a traditional Inuit country of scattered camps and 
outports where people followed the traditional ways of chasing seals and other sea 
mammals for their living.  To integrate the country politically and socially into 
Denmark, the post-war boom in good intentions (which we experienced in Canada no 
less) turned the country upside down.  A modern, urban society was created in the 
Danish image, basing its economic life on a sophisticated industrialised fishery.  An 
old state trading system has become an entire state economy, a great conglomerate, 
publicly controlled but, like all bureaucracies, sometimes ponderous.  But the changes 
were wrought by others.  Often the Greenlander refer to themselves as onlookers 
while an army of Danish labour and technicians changed everything around them.  
There was resentment, and there were also serious problems in adapting to so many 
new ways.  What was old, what was traditionally Greenlandic, what was Inuit, was all 
de-valued. 
 
First it was the social humiliation felt keenly by sensitive young Greenland students in 
Copenhagen, followed by the confident way in which faraway Danes disposed of 
Greenland’s rights in respect of resources and integration in industrial Europe, that 
fired the home rule movement.  This broad national movement broke during the 
negotiation of home rule into political tendencies which have since become 
Greenland’s parties in the Greenland parliament or Landsting.  But the unity of 
purpose on home rule remained, the only difference then as now being the degree and 
pace of autonomy desired by the various groupings. 
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ETHNICITY, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 
 
The Danish image in North America may be as a permissive and relaxed society, but 
in Greenland it is often the more Germanic demand for order in the Danish character 
which is remarked.  Certainly it is hard to imagine two cultures more different than 
Inuit and Danish, although it is to the credit of both peoples that they have been able 
to work out their differences as well and happily together as they have done.  At the 
time that Canute [d. AD 1035] was carrying Danish foreign policy to its high water 
mark in Britain and Europe, the ancestors of the modern-day Inuit were beginning to 
move into Greenland from Canada’s Arctic islands.  A whale-hunting society from 
the Bering Sea, this so-called Thule migration followed on successive earlier 
movements which had peopled the Arctic with Eskimoan cultures.  The precise 
relations between these people and their predecessors, the Dorsets, is not fully agreed.  
Researches at archeological sites now underway in the Canadian Arctic may hold 
some answers. 
 
Changing climate patterns required changing adaptations to the ocean’s living 
resources and the rather sparse land-based ones, in Greenland as in the Canadian 
Arctic.  But European adventurers, later anthropologists and ICC delegates today have 
all been astonished by the common elements among Inuit lifeways and material 
culture.  Despite a trading and official presence from the 18th century, Greenland like 
Northern Canada only received significant material input and European population 
influx from World War II.  In a rush to accommodate Greenlandic desires for 
modernisation whose allures had been tasted with the American war-time occupation, 
to de-colonise in the UN spirit, and to bring living standards to Danish norms, 
Denmark, like Canada, totally reshaped the Inuit North.  One way of life and even the 
places people lived were replaced by a new, largely urban replica of life in Denmark.  
Massive apartment blocks, the source of so much social grief, today are the most 
dramatic monuments to that era. 
 
It is probably impossible to separate the pace of change (which was abrupt [sic]) from 
the content of that change (which was almost total) in assessing the impact.  Inuit 
have always proven remarkably adaptable, and have assimilated change and new 
ideas from many sources.  Archeology shows that while the Vikings may be admired 
as the type of vigorous, direct, outdoors- and profit-oriented white Europeans, they 
were notably impervious to the culture of non-Europeans.  Archeology yields much 
knowledge about viking Greenland (c. AD 985-1500), but shows virtually no 
evidence of the Europeans picking up the skills of the Inuit who, after all, had much to 
teach in the way of coping with cold weather and Arctic food sources, both of which 
were major problems for the Europeans.  Inuit, on the other hand, readily picked up 
useful technology and other forms from the Vikings.  The post-war situation, 
however, is not comparable.  White Europeans set out to transform Greenland and 
Northern Canada, and to remove what they saw as the social conditions which fed 
particular poverty indicators.  The change had many material benefits, but created a 
social confusion and, often, an individual outlook which made those benefits almost 
worthless.  As the Danes came to see these problems, they became receptive to the 
hopes for home rule which promised Inuit an opportunity to regain control of their 
own society and live according to their own styles.  But of course the home rule 
inaugurated in 1979 owes a great deal to modern Danish styles and forms. 
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The debate within Greenland between those who emphasise the Inuit tradition, those 
who see Greenland as a modern European country and those who see it as a unique 
hybrid is lively.  It is unlikely to be soon resolved.  But most Greenlanders, regardless 
of political tendency, would support the strong cultural policy of the Greenland 
government.  The encouragement of Inuit language – the main official language of 
Greenland – and cultural production from theatre to graphic arts, as well as the study 
and display of Greenland’s historical tradition, are top priorities.  They also engage 
some of the best minds and energies in Greenland society, persons who are, as well, 
actively political.  The assertion, development and retrieval of cultural identity are 
major tasks, not only of Greenlanders but also of the other Northern peoples around 
the world. 
 
There are misleading notions alive in our modern majority societies.  A sort of Social 
Darwinism persists and assumes that minority peoples, languages and cultures 
disappear into a majority mass.  The work of the Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik 
Barth and those continuing his work in Norway and Denmark on persistence and 
change in cultural boundaries is illuminating, however.  Changes in material culture 
and political form, and even in domination by or assimilation of other groups, do not 
necessarily alter the insistence on group identity.  Canadians with their own agonies 
over language policy fresh in mind may consider the language issue.  Greenlanders 
are turning to their traditional language and enhancing its role in all walks of life.  
They continue to learn Danish and use it in certain contexts.  But more and more they 
are also learning English because their newly enhanced personality in the world 
requires a world language for practical use.  Canadians wallow in foolish argument 
about the relative superiority of English and French, but many of the world’s peoples 
– including those in Northern areas – comfortably employ two, three or more tongues.  
Whatever the recognition of local languages by southerly-based national 
governments, and the Danes provided support in recent times, adequate policies await 
the direction of the local people themselves – Faroese or Greenlandic, Canadian Inuit 
or Dene.  It is they who have had to insist on their language rights and programs of 
implementation despite the relative readiness of governments to extend other services 
like teaching and social assistance with their homogenising impacts.  Here as in other 
ways, southern policy towards the North has essentially been one of assimilation 
more than of recognition or acceptance of distinct needs. 
 
The small Danish population in Greenland (about 20% of the total of 50,000, half of 
which 20% are short-term workers) has no political importance.  But its influence on 
social culture cannot be doubted, because it is part of the dominant consumer world of 
European fashions in dress or ideas alike, and because it is concentrated in executive 
management and higher technical skills.  Like the lot of any colonial who lingers on 
after independence, the Dane’s life may not always be totally comfortable.  He or she 
may be resented in part for the very skills which are employed for local benefit, 
simply because such skills are not readily available among the Inuit population and, 
therefore, reflect the continuing disadvantage of that population. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL AND INDUSTRIAL ISSUES 
 
Canadians are familiar with the intensity of Northern environmental clashes.  We are 
used to Inuit and Indian peoples fighting proposed hydro-electric dams, oil tanker 
traffic, mines and road-building because they pose a threat to the living environment.  
Such projects pose a double threat:  in themselves, and as an opening and a precedent 
for enlarged or further activities.  It was largely this latter concern which lay behind 
the extraordinary intervention of Greenland Inuit politicians, experts and ‘simple’ 
hunters before Canada’s National Energy Board in relation to the Arctic Pilot Project 
in the early 1980s.  The fear was not only the immediate risk of fuel oil pollution from 
tankers carrying liquefied natural gas, but the opening of an era of Canadian Arctic 
industrialisation employing shipping, and especially the shipping of oil, through 
Greenland’s fishing grounds in Davis Strait.  The formidable cooperation of Canadian 
and Greenland Inuit in opposing that project, with Alaskan Inuit material support, 
remains the most dramatic example of international Inuit cooperation.  Work now 
well begun by Northern Canadian Indians and Inuit with the Greenlanders, Alaska 
natives and others, in respect of the world-wide animal rights lobby which threatens 
the traditional hunting and trapping economy of Northern peoples, may soon become 
even more significant. 
 
The Greenlanders have also been very circumspect about mining, having refused the 
opportunity to develop the EEC’s only uranium deposit because of the many 
environmental and moral issues associated with that mineral.  They have worried 
about the social consequences should they later be faced with applications to develop 
the large iron deposit up the fjord from the capital, a site which would require a large 
and largely non-Greenlandic work force, and a project which would also open new 
issues related to the physical environment.  However, they have, after much soul-
searching, allowed an oil exploration program on land in East Greenland, while 
continuing to assert their total opposition to offshore operations.  That Jameson Land 
project has now been put off because of collapsing oil prices, but was a major political 
event because the government accepted that the potential value of revenue self-
sufficiency vis-à-vis Denmark was desirable, even in a disputed environmental matter.  
However, it would be quite wrong to assert, as some have done, that Greenlanders 
have simply abandoned their old environmental consciousness with the Jameson Land 
exploration approval.  They believe, rather, that they can exercise strict control, obtain 
knowledge of a major industry, create some employment opportunities (having 
already set up a joint venture company with Alaskan Inuit to do much of the Jameson 
Land work) and protect the physical environment, notably from the hazards of ocean 
spills from tankers in Scoresby Sund.  Various close observers of the scene see in this 
decision a growing national self-confidence. 
 
Northern environmental concerns are not quixotic episodes on the part of radical or 
idealistic youth, but expressions of economic interest by peoples whose very mental 
culture and outlook are closely bound up with the living environment from which they 
have always lived.  It is part economic interest – of users of living resources opposed 
to outside users who are intruding into a traditional resource base – but it is also social 
and cultural interest.  The stability of Northern societies relies on the rhythm of the 
seasons in resource use, whether herding or hunting, fishing or berry-picking.  The 
lifeways of Northern peoples in inclement climates among limited resources are not as 
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plentiful in choice or sometimes in return as in areas to the south.  That means that 
when a threat develops in relation to basic activities, it is indeed a basic threat! 
 
As can be seen in the virulent North Norwegian campaign against EEC membership 
in 1972 and in the studied Greenland campaign of 1981-2 to withdraw from the EEC, 
many aspects of social and cultural preference become caught up with issues of the 
use and style of exploitation of the natural environment.  These may seem foolish to 
urban North Americans, but if someone proposed a helpful new policy to upset our 
working lives and change our accustomed pastimes, as well as siphon off the proceeds 
of our local resources to unknown persons far away, we, too, would fight with a will.  
The fact that the industrial exploitation of Northern areas conflicts with existing 
resource use and economic development is one thing; the fact that it is supported and 
encouraged in the face of local sensitivities by national governments dominated by 
other larger cultures to the south makes it a political issue.  This has been the 
situation throughout the international North – in Canada and Lapland and Greenland.  
It is a main reason (along with differences over international fisheries policy) why 
Greenland’s ministers argued for withdrawing from the EEC and abandoning 
integration with industrial Europe.  The final vote to pull out followed the 
inauguration of home rule, but was a major issue in the development of the home rule 
movement. 
 
 
PROPRIETARY AND DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 
 
Closely related to the previous point are ownership and the management of 
development.  It is usually in a conflict situation that Northern peoples, as did the 
Greenlanders, become aware of just how few recognised rights they have under 
existing political arrangements.  The Greenlanders may have a separate language, 
culture and people, but when it comes to sub-surface and offshore resources, the 
Danish realm is united.  The political compromise in home rule did, however, leave 
open a door for further negotiations, and did recognise some fundamental rights 
(albeit undefined) to resources on the part of Greenlanders.  The arrangement agreed 
is an impressive one, impressive again on the part of a broad-minded Danish 
government.  Denmark, with few sub-surface resources, has great potential in the 
huge bulk of Greenland, an extension of Canada’s Pre-Cambrian shield of rock and 
presumably every bit as rich in minerals, most of them hidden under the ice.  But the 
Danes agreed to share control with Greenland on an equal footing.  The Danish and 
Greenlandic authorities must each agree to resource policies and projects, on- or off-
shore.  So to avoid showdowns they negotiate terms satisfactory to each.  The two 
sides pick a chairman, currently the Greenland premier, so there is another advantage 
for Greenland.  Revenues gained from development are to be applied against the 
Danish subsidy to Greenland home rule, and should that be paid off in any year, 
further revenues would be shared 50-50.  Few people believe this final point would 
survive a test and it is often thought that eventually this financial sharing provision 
could become a major issue of political conflict between Greenland and Denmark, 
with Greenland seeking a considerably larger revenue share. 
 
Real resources management power, combined with the wide planning and 
environmental powers vested in Greenland home rule in respect of on- and off-shore 
matters, mean that a Northern people have gone a very long way in achieving what 
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all Northern peoples seek.  This accommodation, central to so many problems in 
Canadian development, is worth consideration elsewhere.  It has not meant that 
Northern people have rejected development, but it has given them a stake in it.  It has 
also meant that the conservation of the Arctic environment and living resources there 
are being watched over by people who really care.  As Greenland premier Motzfeldt 
said to me in an interview in spring, 1981, Inuit must be ‘the soldiers and police’ 
defending the Arctic environment because if the environment is despoiled, there 
would be no more Inuit society. 
 
 
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 
 
Sparse Northern populations are seldom adequately represented in national 
legislatures.  This is ‘fairness’, the old ‘rep by pop’ principle.  Hence Greenland had 
little political clout in Copenhagen, although in a system of shifting party alliances 
and narrow parliamentary votes it sometimes did have an MP well enough placed to 
exert enormous influence.  A more bitter minority feeling came when Greenland 
voted massively in 1972 against EEC membership but was swept into the EEC 
anyway as part of the large Danish Yes vote.  As we have seen, Greenland feelings 
about the European industrial world were fundamental. 
 
In Northern Canada, Inuit now have an election district which coincides with their 
proposed Nunavut territorial jurisdiction.  It has by far the smallest number of voters 
of any election district in Canada.  This Inuit seat in Parliament has proven a great 
benefit, allowing an Inuit voice to be heard in Ottawa.  In Northern Quebec Inuit have 
sought the same sort of district, although now that the Prime Minister is their MP they 
are satisfied for the moment.  The Inuit parliamentary seat has provided a vehicle 
whereby Northerners can gain access to the programs and institutions, the 
personalities and useful practical ‘street smarts’ of the national capital.  It has drawn 
Inuit more closely into Canadian public life, and given them more contact with the 
principles of that life.  Had government intended the change as a device for 
integration, they could not have picked one cheaper or more effective. 
 
The other question is, of course, regional political representation vis-à-vis locally 
important subjects.  The establishment of a representative body in Greenland with 
more than advisory tasks was sought.  Probably the single most contentious issue in 
the Northern world’s politics today is this:  what powers to give a regional legislative 
body, one representing and elected by whom (everyone, or separate ones for special 
cultural groups?), with what sort of revenue base, and with what territorial 
application of powers and rights?  In Greenland the previously established Faroese 
home rule provided a basis, while in Canada we have tended to rely on our federal-
provincial division of powers model, not always a useful guide in new Northern 
situations.  In the event, Greenland won a legislature which has the powers and 
financial means equivalent to a provincial government in Canada.  The current 
Norwegian debate on a national Sami (Lapp) parliament and local and regional Sami 
councils in North Norway illustrates the confusions, heat and threats to convention 
posed by such moves. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE AND SELF-MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES 
 
As Judge Berger has well noted in his book on Alaska, the land claims settlement of 
1971 established American business corporations in areas of hitherto traditional 
culture causing disruption and conflict within ancient societies.  Indeed, this 
assimilation to American ways was one of the purposes of the settlement in the minds 
of Senator Henry Jackson and others who promoted it.  Here and elsewhere in the 
Northern world we can see that the size, the assumptions and shape of structures, and 
their accessibility to control and active management by local people, are key 
questions.  In Northern Camada we are discovering that neo-colonialism may be every 
bit as much a threat to Northern peoples and society as was colonialism if the only 
change is a new local face on top of the same old structural behemoth. 
 
In Greenland the home rule commission left behind a detailed report with many ideas 
for administration, a sort of turn-key operation.  This is a useful idea and one now 
begun by the Nunavut Constitutional Forum developing plans to implement Inuit 
government in Northern Canada.  Nevertheless, the danger is that such schemes are 
little more than fine tuning a larger system which is inherently alien to the Northern 
context with its small numbers, relatively few specialty-trained persons, and easy 
familiarity with immediate issues on the part of local staff.  In North Slope Alaska, 
faced with the prospect of rapid change, Mayor Eben Hopson developed a retraining 
and upgrading program tied to new projects and services to supply the region with an 
array of new skills.  But the fear has been expressed by many foreign observers of 
Greenland home rule that the Danish system remains, with its requirements for Danes 
and Danish-trained staff, and that this continues alienating effects of colonial times. 
 
A glance at home rule in the Faroe Islands shows how the filling of jobs with local 
people, and the management of governmental and economic functions from within the 
local society, makes self-rule a reality and a satisfying one.  In Northern Canada the 
matching of institutions, management forms, technology (such as computers and 
telecommunications among highly dispersed communities), with local skills, attitudes 
and aptitudes, promises to be the most challenging part of coming self-government. 
 
Greenland is now digesting the two great elements of its public sector and economic 
life – the KGH industry, business and service conglomerate, and the Greenland 
Technical Organisation.  The object is to have these comfortably and accountably 
managed in Greenland, by Greenlanders. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The questions remaining, and the questions for the future, are really only two. 
 
1. Will Denmark and Greenland’s neighbours, including Canada, be wise 
enough to pursue policies which respect the social sensitivities of a new 
nation, the environmental sensitivities of an Arctic people whose 
consciousness is permeated with their natural world, and the political 
imperatives of a newly liberated minority?  Beyond the polite curiosity of 
some of the more sensitive national officials in our various countries, that 
wisdom is not yet evident. 
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2. Will the institutional, economic and political structure left behind by the 
Danish administration suit the capacities in Greenland’s society and economy, 
and allow real self-management by Greenlanders?  There is no answer to this 
question in sight, although there are voices on both sides. 
 
In other words, Canada and other Northern countries have an opportunity to help 
Greenland succeed in its quest for self-development, and they may do that most 
productively by reinforcing the imperatives evident within Greenlandic society itself.  
Trying to impose models of strategic politics and international economic reason on 
this emerging nation are as unlikely to be useful as they were in Europe’s final 
attempts to win Greenland’s continued membership in the EEC.  The direction, 
development and issues of the international North are confounding conventional 
wisdom in all our Northern countries.  It is time they were understood.  There is no 
need to let them become worries at future security conferences. 
 
The greatest importance of Greenland in the international North is as a model of 
local self-determination and national political accommodation.  The emergence of 
Greenland illustrates dynamics and tensions alive in all Northern countries.  The 
forces and factors at work in Greenland’s Inuit society, and the lively intelligence and 
generosity at work in Danish de-colonisation are full of lessons. 
 
The context is virtually the same in the Sami (Lapp) homeland of North Norway, 
Sweden, and Finland where government commissions, Northern peoples’ groups and 
often highly educated local individuals are in a race to sort out cultural preotections, 
elected Sami institutions, environment and land use regulation, and economic 
development policies.  In Alaska, as Canada’s Judge Tom Berger has written in his 
new ICC-sponsored study, Village Journey, the 1971 claims settlement has failed and 
rising demands for native self-government and real decision-making power in relation 
to lands and waters are being made.  The politics of environment and society vis-à-vis 
southerly decision-making powers are alive and well in Iceland, the Faroe Islands and 
Shetland.  What we know of the Soviet North shows that Northern people there, too, 
have the usual difficulties in accepting or fitting into an industrial world.  And across 
Northern Canada, some 75% of our land area when the non-agricultural North with its 
mostly rural, mostly aboriginal population is counted, are many peoples – Cree, 
Naskapi, Ojibway, Haida, Nootka, Dene, Metis and Inuit, and many others – who are 
putting forward their proposals for a new deal. 
 
The entire Northern world is a simmering pot of minority peoples and politics out of 
sympathy and out of harmony with the national majorities whose industrial goals, 
defense establishments, energy and economic analysis, and Northern transportation 
plans linger in centralised and remote modes of study and decision-making.  In the 
aggregates juggled by southern officials involved in these, the small populations of 
Northern areas do not loom large; their distinct aspirations and cultural biases do 
not loom at all. 
 
In the North, in Canada and abroad, are well-informed persons chafing at social and 
political minority status; ancient cultures whose basic qualities such as language of 
daily speech are denied or downgraded; government-backed development threatening 
local resource use and assumed rights, often in the name of some ‘national unity’ or 
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higher interest which may seem a handy disguise for the bully; outright environmental 
threats to local livelihoods; and population influxes, temporary or more permanent, 
creating social tensions and threatening the accustomed local political consensus.  The 
results are political movements with various names – land claims or home rule or 
whatever – seeking to define the identity and collective cultural rights of ancient 
societies in defined territories with clear legal and jurisdictional relationships to 
national governments.  When one looks at it, this is merely common sense, is it not?  
Yet southern governments with their macro-economic and security interests tend to 
see these developments as annoying or, more impatiently, as threatening. 
 
Canadians, like people in the other Northern countries, have pushed their south with 
its material benefits northwards – in Canada into the homelands of Inuit, Indian and 
Metis peoples.  But at this remarkable moment in history a glimmer of hope has 
stopped the process.  The Northern peoples in Canada, fitted into programs of 
assimilationist paternalism in the territories and mostly just ignored in the Northern 
provincial areas, have been talking back.  Now they have succeeded in renegotiating 
their futures and reinterpreting their past at series of meetings which regularly include 
full-scale televised conferences between Indian, Metis and Inuit leaders with the 
Canadian prime minister and provincial premiers.  Bankers, labour leaders, mayors of 
great cities and captains of industry have no such status, but the representatives of the 
peoples whose cultures are tied to the lands, waters and resources of this continent do.  
The political accommodation which was ignored when this country was formed into a 
modern state is at last being worked out. 
 
There are hundreds of men and women in governments and aboriginal associations 
across this country, and in universities, working full-time on something called 
‘aboriginal self-government’.  Many more are spending much of their time travelling 
to mind-numbing meetings to discuss the subject.  For a country which is shaking out 
labour from public bodies, this allocation of man- and woman-power is the more 
astonishing.  But then domestic inter-governmental relations have the fascination for 
Canadians which the jokes say love has for the French, money for Americans, and 
skiing for Norwegians.  Despite this interest, to date there has not been a lot of useful 
guidance provided.  But one recent Canadian government report is an exception.  In a 
document called Living Treaties:  Lasting Agreements, the Task Force to Review 
Comprehensive Claims Policy has proposed that Canada resolve these matters 
through a process of negotiation with the original inhabitants of traditional cultural 
regions.3  They recognise that these regions or ‘homelands’ must be the basis for any 
comprehensive planning. 
 
We encourage the development of negotiation and settlement proposals that 
take into consideration matters such as the economic potential of the lands and 
resources; the nature of governmental jurisdiction over the lands, either shared 
federal and provincial or exclusive federal jurisdiction [as in the Northwest 
Territories and Yukon where Ottawa, then, can act without need of provincial 
concurrence]; the availability of wildlife and fishery; and the capacity of the 
aboriginal group to become self-governing. (p. 48 of report) 
 
                                                 
3 Report dated December 1985 but actually published March 19, 1986, by the Minister of 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Ottawa. 
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Nobody thinks it will be quick or easy, but such a process would then lead to eventual 
self-government and self-management involving regional economic opportunities and 
use of some unoccupied lands.  Such a policy, shaped to regional possibility and 
accepting the collective survival of a society within a defined territory as the goal, 
would be independent of the boomtowns of southern industrial society with their large 
populations and voting power.  In some areas like the Inuit Eastern Arctic territory 
known as Nunavut, those boomtown centres of southern population and culture have 
not yet appeared.  But elsewhere the towns tend to be islands of southern material 
culture linked to southern centres and fashions rather than to their own hinterland.  
The establishment of new Northern governments with their social, cultural, economic 
and environmental powers and programs, and their stake in regional resource 
development, will take time.  A paragraph like that quoted above should be placed as 
a preambular provision of policy intention in the Canadian Constitution to guide 
policy-makers – with their amazingly short memories – in the years ahead.  It is not 
surprising that the Task Force chairman and executive director whose determination 
and insight dominate the report are themselves veterans of political development work 
in Canada’s North, and persons who well understand the dynamic realities of 
Northern social and political change.  This insight is evident all through the Task 
Force report. 
 
Meanwhile, Northern peoples wrestle with the problems posed for them by 
institutions and policies designed by others.  Even at the point of taking over their 
own governance they may find that their people have not been trained or conditioned 
to handle what is essentially a foreign system.  Canadian Inuit establishing the 
Nunavut government are wrestling with this question and are extremely nervous about 
the possibility of relying on hired whites, who have already disrupted their world 
almost totally, or on unprepared local people who might not be able to work the 
unfamiliar levers.  A vigorous program of skill upgrading and administrative 
implementation is underway. 
 
Certainly a self-government situation which broke down in the Northern world, 
whether through lack of proper preparation or any other reason, could do much harm 
to inter-ethnic relations, regional predictability and internal stability.  But the present 
corrosive tutelage in which large Northern areas are kept by remote governments who 
believe periodic concessions and hand-outs enough to win loyalty is more dangerous.  
The effective management of territory and the assurance of democratic institutions in 
the North for the future require the encouragement of self-governing entities with 
relevant and adequate power and budgets.  The Northern peoples are defining their 
terms, and refining their goals.  It is up to national governments to respond with 
political accommodation and to help provide the support infrastructure of skills and 
structures needed to take on new tasks in old societies. 
 
*** 
 
 
Original endnotes. 
 
1.  Various articles discuss Greenland, and do so in relation to Canadian interests.  A current 
one with excellent illustrations is ‘Inuit cousins, but oh how different!:  Life in Frobisher Bay, 
NWT [now Iqaluit, Nunavut], and Nuuk, Greenland’, by Dane Lanken, in Canadian 
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Geographic, April/May, 1986.  Another is my own ‘Greenland:  Lessons of self-government 
and development’, being Northern Perspectives, Vol. VII, No. 8, 1979, published by the 
Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, Ottawa.  A recent monograph on Greenland and 
Northern Canada with many thought-provoking analyses is Northern Development:  Northern 
Security, by Nils Ørvik, in Northern Studies Series, No. 1-83, published by the Centre for 
International Relations, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada.  A book placing 
Greenland Inuit political development in the context of the Inuit international North is Philip 
Lauritzen’s Oil and Amulets – Inuit:  A People United at the Top of the World, Breakwater, St. 
John’s, Newfoundland, Canada, 1983 (this English edition being a much revised and updated 
version of the Danish original of 1979). 
 
A major new source on the social processes and history of Greenland is contained in Arctic, 
ed. David Damas, being Volume 5 of Handbook of North American Indians, published by the 
Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC, in 1985.  In addition to the many essays on 
Greenland’s past by Inge Kleivan, the late Helge Kleivan, Finn Gad and Robert Petersen et 
al., is Helge Kleivan’s classic which I highly recommend, ‘Contemporary Greenlanders’, at 
page 700. 
 
2.  PETER JULL of Ottawa is an adviser to Inuit associations on political affairs, self-
government and constitutional issues.  The framework of minority self-government and 
practical self-management within it have been his principal interests.  He also writes on 
Northern affairs in Canada and abroad, and on social and political change among Northern 
peoples; several governments in Canada have published his studies on these subjects.  From 
1968 to 1980 he was a cabinet adviser in federal and provincial governments in Canada, and 
earlier an assistant to the head of government in the Northwest Territories.  [His] new 
monograph, Politics, Development and Conservation in the International North, was published 
by the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, Ottawa, in April, 1986, dealing with issues 
elsewhere in the international North similar to those discussed in relation to Greenland in this 
paper. 
 
 
New End-note, May 2003 
 
This paper was written in special circumstances.  It was remarkable at the time for someone 
representing indigenous peoples, in effect, to be invited to speak at a defence conference in 
Canada.  So it was an important opportunity to explain the authenticity of indigenous political 
agendas in general and the rise of Greenland in particular to persons more likely to dismiss 
both as quixotic or dangerous.  A Greenland home rule representative was expected to attend 
the conference and speak, so I did not give a summary of the home rule plan and politico-
legal framework.  In fact I had to talk around such an expected presentation, but make mine 
self-sufficient in case such speaker did not arrive.  That guest who didn’t come to dinner has 
now more than one clear exposition of Greenland home rule in print:  I find especially useful 
his, i.e., Frederik Harhoff’s, 'Palestinian Self-Government Viewed from a Distance:  An 
International Legal Comparison Between Palestinian Self-Government and Greenland's 
Home Rule', Palestinian Yearbook of International Law, Vol VIII, 1994/95, 55-77. 
 
The northern spring of 1986 was also the moment when Canada began to take the Arctic 
seriously, or rather, to make the connection between the daily problem-ridden social Arctic 
and the grand conceptual Arctic.  In June 1986, for instance, the crucial Northern chapter in a 
Parliamentary report appeared:  Simard J-M & Hockin T, 1986:  ‘A Northern Dimension for 
Canada’s Foreign Policy’, Independence and Internationalism:  Report of the Special Joint 
Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Canada’s International Relations, 
Ottawa, June 1986, 127-135.  Some months later I discussed that connection between two 
policy and political worlds in a paper, ‘Canadian Policy and Perspective in the Circumpolar 
North’, Changing Times, Challenging Agendas, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 
Ottawa, 1988, pp 140-159.  Indeed, the conference at which that paper was a keynote piece 
was a critical and exciting moment, producing directly and indirectly many more 
developments.  Some of that can be seen in the full published proceedings, ‘Canada's 
Interests in the International Arctic’, Changing Times, Challenging Agendas:  Economic and 
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Political Issues in Canada's North, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, Ottawa, 1988, pp 
109-159. 
 
Meanwhile, a particularly useful general account of Greenland’s pre- and early post-home rule 
politics despite its misleading title is Lars Toft Rasmussen’s 'Greenlandic and Danish 
Attitudes to Canadian Arctic Shipping', Politics of the Northwest Passage, ed. Franklyn 
Griffiths, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 1987, pp 134-159 [notes 290].  The 
Danish and Greenlandic governments publish an overview booklet, Greenland on the way:  
Home Rule since 1979, Greenland Home Rule Government & Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Nuuk & Copenhagen, 1997. 
 
Much has happened in Greenland, and much has been written about it, since this paper was 
written in early 1986.  Much in Canada’s approach to Inuit at home and abroad, and in 
Canada vis-à-vis Northern territories in general and Nunavut in particular, has also evolved.  
A sceptical but useful account of how far Greenland home rule has travelled is J Kaalhauge 
Nielsen’s Greenland’s geopolitical reality and its political-economic consequences, DUPI 
Working Paper No 2001/6, The Danish Institute of International Affairs, Copenhagen, 2001.  
The longtime insider and expert, Jens Dahl, has also written much, e.g., ‘Self-Government in 
Greenland’, Indigenous Affairs, 3/01, 36-41.  The Thule military base in North Greenland has 
attracted an entire literature of its own, furthermore. 
 
The developments in the Inuit North of Canada have been dramatic, too, e.g., 
 
Jull P, 2001.  ‘Negotiating Nationhood, Renegotiating Nationhood:  Canada’s Nunavut and 
Nunavut’s Canada’ Balayi: Culture, Law and Colonialism, Vol. 3, 2001, 67-86.  Full draft 
online at: http://eprint.uq.edu.au/archive/00000098/ 
and 
Jull P, 2001.  ‘”Nations with whom We are connected”:  Indigenous Peoples and Canada’s 
Political System’, 3rd ed., Discussion Paper, School of Political Science and International 
Studies, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Sept. 15, 2001, 55 pages.  Published in 
Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 6(2) and 6(3), but full text available online:  
http://eprint.library.uq.edu.au/archive/00000099/ 
 
Furthermore, Inuit of Greenland, Canada, Alaska, and, since 1989, Chukotka (the north-
eastern tip of Siberia) have been vigorous in international political and environmental forums, 
not least through their international Inuit Circumpolar Conference.  Now it seems that 1986 
was long ago, but I am making this paper available because students and others have found 
it useful as a snapshot of a time when the Northern political world was much younger and we 
seemed to be making all things new. 
